Security researchers from MASSGRAVE have unveiled TSforge, a groundbreaking tool exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Software Protection Platform (SPP) to activate every version of Windows from Windows 7 onward, including Office suites and add-ons.
This exploit marks the first successful direct attack against SPP’s core cryptographic defenses since its introduction in Windows Vista.
At its core, SPP relies on encrypted “trusted stores” to validate activation status.
These stores exist as:-
- data.dat/tokens.dat files (Windows 8+)
- 7B296FB0-… registry-backed files (Windows 7)
- HKLMSYSTEMWPA keys (all versions)
Trusted Store Locations Across Windows Versions (Source – MassGrave)
TSforge’s breakthrough came from reverse-engineering SPP’s private key infrastructure through leaked Windows 8 beta builds.
Researchers at MassGrave identified that modifying these trusted stores with forged activation data—while bypassing RSA-2048/AES-CBC encryption—could trick SPP into accepting permanent licenses.
Breaking SPP’s Cryptographic Chain
The exploit hinges on extracting SPP’s production RSA private key, which Microsoft uses to sign activation blobs.
By simulating ExecCodes – an obscure bytecode interpreter in sppsvc.exe—researchers derived the private exponent through addition-chain exponentiation:-
# Simplified simulation of ExecCodes modular exponentiation def mod_exp(base, exponent, modulus): result = 1 while exponent > 0: if exponent % 2 == 1: result = (result * base) % modulus base = (base ** 2) % modulus exponent = exponent // 2 return result private_key = mod_exp(encrypted_blob, d, n) # d/n from SPP’s key
Forged Activation Blob (Source – MassGrave)
This allowed decrypting the AES key protecting data.dat. Once decrypted, TSforge injects:-
- Zeroed HWID hashes (B25D3E80…) to bypass hardware fingerprint checks
- Precomputed product key blobs mimicking KMS/MAK activations
- Timestamped license metadata with 4000+ year validity windows
The tool’s impact is amplified by its cross-version compatibility—it manipulates Windows 7’s spsys.sys driver architecture and Windows 10’s unified sppsvc.exe equally effectively.
Microsoft has yet to comment, but enterprise clients using KMS should audit their activation logs for 0xC004F200 spoofed status codes.
While MASSGRAVE hasn’t released TSforge publicly, their findings expose fundamental flaws in SPP’s “validate once, trust forever” model.
As Windows 10’s 2025 end-of-life approaches, this exploit could reshape enterprise licensing strategies, forcing Microsoft to rethink activation security from the ground up.
